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The Privilege on BankAssets for Collection
Items---Louisiana Act 63 of 1926*
CLYDE W. THURMONt
It is common knowledge that banks are universally employed
by creditors located in the state and in other states and nations as
agents for the purpose of collecting commercial paper. Naturally
the facilities of banks readily lend themselves for the purposes
of a common collection agency. One who places an item with a
bank solely for the purpose of collection does not intend to trust
the solvency and financial responsibility of the bank, but wishes
only to avail himself of its collection facilities.
Prior to the passage of Act 63 of 1926,1 when an item was in-
trusted to a bank as an agent merely for collection and remittance
and not for deposit, the owner had no protection against the
bank's becoming insolvent and failing to remit or deliver the pro-
ceeds so collected. He could recover the funds only if they had
been kept separate from the bank's general assets and were sus-
ceptible of identification. 2 Where they had been commingled with
the other funds of the bank there was no law in Louisiana which
gave any privilege or preference to the one who had employed
the bank as a .collector. He was treated as an ordinary creditor of
the insolvent bank and shared pro rata with other ordinary credi-
tors.' The legislature evidently deemed this situation to be in-
equitable; consequently, the statute under consideration was en-
acted in 1926. 4 At that time the case of Sabine Canal Company v.
* This article was written in collaboration with Dr. Harriet S. Daggett,
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University and is to appear soon as a
chapter in a book by Dr. Daggett entitled Louisiana Priv4Zeges and Chatte'
Mortgages.
t Instructor in Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 648-651.
2. L'Hammedieu v. Penny's Executors, 6 La. 599 (1834); Stetson, Avery
and Co. v. Gurney, 17 La. 162 (1841); Beatty v. McCleod, 11 La. Ann. 76 (1856);
Young v. Teutonia Bank & Trust Co., 134 La. 879, 64 So. 806 (1914); Sabine
Canal Co. v. Crowley Trust & Savings Bank, 164 La. 33, 113 So. 754 (1927).
8. Young v. Teutonia Bank & Trust Co., 134 La. 879, 64 So. 806 (1914);
Sabine Canal Co. v. Crowley Trust & Savings Bank, 164 La. 33, 113 So. 754
(1927).
4. La. Act 63 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) H 648-651].
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Crowley Trust & Savings Bank5 was pending in the district court;
"and the language of the two sections of the statute applies. so
precisely and peculiarly, and respectively, to the two propositions
of law that were presented in that case that it seems quite cer-
tain that the new law was prompted by the happenings in that
case."6
This brief history shows that the purpose of the act is to pro-
tect those whose checks, drafts, bills, notes, et cetera, are collected
by a bank as agent, when the proceeds collected are mingled with
the money of the bank in violation of the instructions to remit or
deliver the proceeds, and when the funds cannot, therefore, be
identified as the property of the owner of the instrument. The
court has very pertinently said:
"The Legislature, therefore, drew the distinction between the
fiduciary relation of principal and agent, and the relation of
depositor and depositary, which is the relation merely of the
ordinary creditor and debtor."
ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE
Sections 1 and 2 of Act 63 of 1926 create privileges on the
assets of banks in certain cases. It is perfectly obvious from a
mere reading of the statute that each section was enacted to
cover a separate and distinct situation.
Section 1 provides that "when any bank receives as agent
(whether as agent of another bank or of any person, firm or cor-
poration) for collection and remittance or delivery to its princi-
pal and not for deposit any bill, note, check, order, draft, bond,
receipt, bill of lading, or other evidence of indebtedness, or other
instrument, and collects or realizes any money on the same, and
has not deposited same to the credit of said principal, the princi-
pal shall have a privilege on all of the property and assets of said
agent bank for the amount so collected or realized by said agent
bank... ." (Italics supplied.) An analysis of this section of the
statute shows that there are three indispensable requirements
5. 164 La. 33, 113 So. 754 (1927). Act 63 of 1926 was introduced in the legis-
lature by Senator A. M. Smith who was interested in the outcome of that
case. Mr. Smith took an active part in the preparation and passage of the
act. See the excellent explanation of the history and purpose of the statute
prepared by Judge Hugh C. Cage, District Judge, Orleans Parish, quoted in
full by the supreme court in In re Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Pan American
Life Ins. Co., Intervener), 185 La. 448, 462, 169 So. 464, 468 (1936).
6. In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Jones County, Inter-
vener), 181 La. 335, 342, 159 So. 576, 578 (1935).
7. 181 La. at 342, 159 So. at 578. See note 5, supra.
19411
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
which must be complied with before the statute is applicable,
viz:8 (1) The holder or owner of the bill, note, check, draft, et
cetera, must send it to the bank as agent, for collection and remit-
tance or delivery to the principal and not for deposit (2) there
must be an actual collection, or realization by the bank as agent,
of the proceeds represented by the instrument; (3) the proceeds
must not have been deposited to the credit of the principal. How-
ever, a deposit of the proceeds of a paper sent to the bank for
collection and remittance, without the consent, either express or
implied, of the owner, and which he had not later acquiesced in
wbuld not deprive the sender of the privilege.' In the case of
Brock v. Citizens Bank & Trust Company the court said:
"The privilege established by section 1 of the act arises and
attaches to the bank's assets only when it, as agent, receives
for 'collection and remittance or delivery to its principal and
not for deposit any bill, note, check,' etc., and collects the
same. The act further states 'and has not deposited same (the
proceeds) to the credit of said principal.' Of course, this refers
to an authorized deposit to the principal's account and not to
the one unauthorized. It is essential to defeat the privilege
that the deposit be made with the principal's approval. In re
Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 181 La. 335, 159 So.
576 (1937)."1O (Italics supplied.)
Section 2 provides that "whenever any bank shall send for
collection to any other bank, domiciled in a different place, a
check or draft drawn on the latter bank by a depositor of such
drawee bank and such drawee bank shall have charged or debited
the account of said depositor with said check or draft and shall
have drawn a check or draft on any bank in representation of the
8. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Higgins in In re Liquidation of
Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Jones County, Intervener), 181 La. 835, 846, 159
So. 576, 580 (1935). The decision was later expressly overruled and the view
of the dissenting justice adopted by a majority of the court. In re Hibernia
Bank & Trust Co. (Pan American Life Ins. Co., Intervener), 185 La. 448, 169
So. 464 (1936).
9. See S. E. Hall, Inc. v. Farmers' Trust & Savings Bank of Lockport, 177
La. 659, 148 So. 909 (1933); In re Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Ferguson, Inter-
vener), 182 La. 45, 161 So. 15 (1935), affirming the judgment of the court of
appeal, 155 So. 266 (194); Brock v. Citizens State Bank & Trust Co., 172 So.
546 (La. App. 1937). See also In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co.
(Jones County, Intervener), 181 La. 335, 159 So. 576 (1935), overruled on an-
other point by In re Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Pan American Life Insur-
ance Co., Intervener), 185 La. 448, 169 So. 464 (1986).
10. 172 So. '546, 548 (La. App. 1937). See Brock v. Citizens Bank & Trust
Co., 180 So. 650 (La. App. 1938), reversed on another point, 190 La. 572, 182 So.
679 (1938).
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amount thereof, then the bank hereinabove first mentioned in this
section shall have a privilege on all the property and assets of the
bank hereinabove secondly mentioned in this section to secure
the payment of the amount of said check or draft hereinabove
first mentioned.... ."I" (Italics supplied.)
An analysis of this section of the statute shows that there are
also three indispensable requirements which must be complied
with before the privilege created thereby comes into existence,
viz: (1) A bank must send for collection to another bank, domi-
ciled in another place, a check or draft on the latter bank by one
of its depositors; (2) such drawee bank must have charged or
debited the account of the depositor with said check or draft; (3)
such drawee must have drawn its own check or draft on another
bank in favor of the forwarding bank in representation of the
amount thereof.
Section 3 of the statute clearly expresses the intention of the
legislature to make the act applicable to national banks12 as well
as state banks by providing that "the word 'bank,' shall, for the
purposes of this act be considered to include bank, 'National
Bank,' 'banker,' 'banking association,' 'saving bank,' and 'trust
company."' 1
8
11. Section 2 of La. Act 63 of 1926 does not purport to deal with the au-
thority of a bank taking commercial paper for collection to appoint sub-
agents for the purpose of effecting the collection and the resulting liability
of the bank for the default of subagents under those circumstances. In that
question there seems to be two conflicting rules. One rule, known as the
Massachusetts rule, is to the effect that the contract for collection, impliedly
authorizes the bank accepting the paper for collection to appoint a proper
and suitable subagent and if the bank has done this, it is hot responsible for
the default of the corresponding bank. The other rule, known as the NeW
York rule, is to the effect that the bank accepting an item for collection
undertakes to perform the whole service required and the bank is held
responsible for the neglect, default, omission or other misconduct of a cor-
respondent bank or other agent to whom the paper is entrusted for collec-
tion. Blackfeet Live Stdck Co. v. Northwestern National Bank, 138 Ore. 530,
5 P. (2d) 702, 80 A.L.R. 805 (1931). The cases are collected in a Note (1931)
80 A.L.R. 815. Louisiana first adopted the Massachusetts rule. Hum v. Union
Bank of Louisiana, 4 Rob. 109 (La. 1843). Later, without referring to the ear-
lier case, the court changed to the New York rule. Martin v. Hibernia Bank &
Trust Co., 127 La. 301, 53 So. 572 (1910). In 1926 Louisiana reverted to the
Massachusetts rule by the passage of La. Act 86 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 653]. See Joffrion-Woods v. St. James Bank & Trust Co., 171 La. 172, 129
So. 808 (1930).
12. See Calcasieu National Bank in Lake Charles v. Bank of Abbeville &
Trust Co., 83 F.(2d) 742 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935), wherein it was held that the Act 63
of 1926 was not applicable insofar as it purported to apply to national banks
because it is incompatible with the national scheme of equal distribution of
the assets of a national bank to all its unsecured creditors. See Louisiana &
N.W.Ry. v. Wylie, 157 So. 804, 807 (La. App. 1934) for dictum to the con-
trary.
13. Section 4 of Act 63 of 1926 repeals all laws or parts of laws contrary
to or inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
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OPERATION OF THE STATUTE
The privilege granted by Act 63 of 1926 is not conditional
upon insolvency, nor is it a preference arising upon liquidation of
a bank, but it arises immediately upon the happening of certain
events prescribed by the statute. However, in practical operation,
so long as the bank is solvent, the privilege would probably be
dormant. Immediately upon insolvency or at a time when the
bank becomes unable to pay its debts, it may be invoked for the
benefit of those favored.
As has been pointed out, Section 3 expresses the intention of
the legislature to make this statute applicable to national banks
as well as state banks. In the case of Louisiana & Northwest Rail-
way Company v. Wylie 14 it was argued that the preference cre-
ated by Act 63 of 1926 was inoperative because the authority of
the federal government pertaining to the operation and liquida-
tion of national banks is paramount, and that under that law the
assets of an insolvent bank must be delivered ratably to the cred-
itors. The court of appeals held the statute inapplicable because
the relationship of debtor and creditor and not principal and agent
existed. However, the court by way of dictum answered the ar-
gument advanced by saying that since the preference or privilege
created by Act 63 of 1926 existed or attached before the insol-
vency, such preference would not be inoperative because of fed-
eral legislation. In so holding, the court followed the well recog-
nized rule that privileges arising by state laws prior to the failure
of a national bank are not invalidated by receivership proceed-
ings. The facts in the case of Calcasieu National Bank in Lake
Charles v. Bank of Abbeville & Trust Company 5 brought the
issue squarely within the provision of Section 2. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, as sought to be
applied to national banks, Act 63 of 1926 is inoperative because it
is incompatible with the national scheme of equal distribution of
the assets of a national bank to all its unsecured creditors in case
of insolvency. The court said:
"It is true that, as applied to state banks (where the Legisla-
ture has paramount authority), the statute by its term is not
conditioned upon insolvency. and the privilege arises immedi-
ately upon the happening of the contingencies which are in-
tended to give it life, but in practical operation the privilege
14. 157 So. 804 (La. App. 1934).
15. 83 F.(2d) 742 (1936).
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will be of benefit only in cases of insolvency of the bank; and
the intent of the state statute must be judged by its practical
operation and effect when the object is to ascertain whether
it conflicts with a federal statute providing for the ratable dis-
tribution of the assets of an insolvent bank."'16
By this decision the act is operative only insofar as it applies to
state banks over which the state legislature has paramount au-
thority.
In the application of this statute the courts have consistently
kept before them the well established rule of the jurisprudence of
this state that statutes conferring a privilege must be strictly con-
strued and cannot be extended by implication or analogy.17 An-
other elementary rule which the court has applied is that the
burden rests upon the party asserting the privilege to prove that
his case comes within the protection of the act.'
In the case of the Bank of White Castle'9 the liquidator listed
the claims of Joffrion-Woods, Incorporated, and L. L. Butler as
privileged under Act 63 of 1926, but did not allow any interest
upon the items. Both claimants filed an opposition praying that
the provisional account be amended so as to include legal interest
and costs on their respective claims. The court allowed interest
on the claim of Joffrion-Woods and then only because that claim-
-int had a judgment recognizing his claim with interest as a priv-
ileged debt under Act 63 of 1926. As to the other claim, the court
refused to allow the privilege for interest, saying:
"There are two reasons which suggest themselves to us
why as a matter of law interest cannot be allowed on the
claims of the nature of those here presented. The first and
most important we think arises from the fact that we are here
dealing with a privileged claim, and under the well-known
rule of construction, any law relating to and regulating priv-
ileges must be strictly applied.""0
The court then pointed out that the statute grants the privilege
16. Id. at 745-746.
17. See Boylan's Detective Agency & Protection Police v. Brown & Co.,
157 La. 325, 102 So. 417 (1924); Red River Constr. Co. v. Pierce Petroleum
Corp., 165 La. 565, 115 So. 752 (1928); In re Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Pan
American Life Ins. Co., Intervener), 185 La. 448, 169 So. 464 (1936).
18. In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention of
Progressive Inv. Co.), 182 La. 856, 162 So. 644 (1935); In re Liquidation of
Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Ross & Heyn, Intervener), 186 La. 229, 172 So. 1
(1937).
39. In re Bank of White Castle, 168 So. 735 (La. App. 1936).
20. Id. at 737.
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for the "amount collected" by an insolvent bank as agent and not
deposited to principal's credit and does not grant the principal a
privilege for interest on the amount so collected.
The other reason advanced was that in the liquidation of an
insolvent institution, and especially one in which the public at
large is interested, it is contrary to the policy of the law to allow
interest on the claims against such insolvent institutions. Al-
though the point was not raised by counsel, the supreme court
reached a contrary result in the case of Brock v. Citizens State
Bank & Trust Company.21 In view of the express words of the
statute granting the privilege for "the amount collected" by the
bank and nothing more, and the well established rule demanding
a strict construction of statutes creating privileges, it would seem
that the latter decision is erroneous in this respect.
The proper criterion for determining whether or not Act 63
of 1926 is applicable has become definitely crystallized as a result
of judicial interpretation. If the relation of depositor and deposi-
tory, which is merely the relation of ordinary creditor and debtor,
is created, then no privilege is granted; but if the fiduciary rela-
tionship of principal and agent is created, then the privilege is
accorded. The mere statement of the rule will not suffice to give
a working knowledge to the practitioner. It, therefore, becomes
necessary to give a somewhat lengthy resume of the cases which
depict the evolution of the rule as well as the practical operation
of the statute. In following this evolution, it would be helpful to
bear in mind the general business conditions existing since the
date of the enactment of this statute.
In the first two cases 22 to arise under this statute, the trans-
actions fell squarely within the terms of Section 1, and the owner
was granted a privilege on the assets of the collecting bank. In
the Joffrion-Woods case 8 plaintiff sought to recover $1,740.32 from
the Bank of White Castle, in liquidation, with recognition of a
privilege on the assets of the defunct bank, under the provision of
Act 63 of 1926. The facts were that one Babin had sent plaintiff
his check for $1,740.32 drawn on the Bank of White Castle. On
January 26, 1927, plaintiff endorsed the check and deposited it
21. 190 La. 572, 182 So. 679 (1988), reversing the court of appeal on other
grounds. See Brock v. Citizens State Bank & Trust Co., 172 So. 546 (La. App.
1937) and 180 So. 650 (La. App. 1938).
22. Joffrion-Woods v. Brock, 180 La. 771, 157 So. 589 (1934), aflirming the
decision of the court of appeal, 154 So. 660 (La. App. 1934); Vivian State
Bank v. Satterwhite, 180 La. 856, 157 So. 788 (1934).
23. 180 La. 771, 157 So. 589 (1934).
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for collection in the St. James Bank at Lutcher. The St. James
Bank sent it to the Hibernia Bank of New Orleans, its corres-
pondent, who upon receipt of the check sent it to the Bank of
White Castle for collection and payment. The Bank of White
Castle received the check on January 29, 1927, marked it paid and
debited the account of the drawer, Babin. In payment of the
amount the Bank of White Castle drew its draft on the Hibernia
Bank of New Orleans and forwarded the check to the drawee
bank, who received it on January 31, 1927, but refused to honor
it. On February 1, 1927, the Bank of White Castle was closed by
the State Bank Commissioner without this draft having been
paid. Plaintiff then brought this suit, resulting in the recognition
of the privilege. In the Vivian State Bank case2 4 the only differ-
ence was that certain notes, instead of checks, were deposited
for collection. The decision in the case of S. E. Hall, Incorporated
v. Farmers' Trust & Savings Bank of Lockport,2 5 has been the
source of a great deal of the trouble in subsequent attempts to
apply the statute. This was a suit to have it decreed that the pro-
ceeds of four drafts were the property of plaintiff and for recogni-
tion and enforcement of a privilege on the assets of the bank as
provided by Act 63 of 1926. These drafts were deposited as checks
on January 10th and 16th, 1931, since no provision was made for
listing drafts. Printed on each deposit slip was, "All checks &
drafts, except on us, credited subject to final payment." The for-
warding bank was closed on January 20, 1931, after which the
four drafts were collected. In awarding judgment for plaintiff
with recognition of the privilege, the court said:
"As to whether the drafts were sold to the Farmers' Trust
& Savings Bank, or were placed there for collection, the pro-
ceeds to be deposited to plaintiff's account when collected, or
were deposited for collection and remittance, depends wholly
upon the intention of the parties, to be determined from the
facts surrounding the transactions."" (Italics supplied.)
Giving considerable weight to the statement on the deposit slip,
"All checks & drafts, except on us, credited subject to final pay-
ment," the court said:
"This statement indicates that it was not the intention of the
parties that title to the drafts should pass to the bank, for the
24. 180 La. 856, 157 So. 788 (1934).
25. 177 La. 659, 148 So. 909 (1933).
26. 177 La. at 662, 148 So. at 909.
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credit to be given was conditional in character, and this fact
is inconsistent with ownership [citing cases] .''27
"When plaintiff deposited the drafts, it did so, we think, for
collection and deposit to its credit, it being implied, as a mat-
ter of course, that, if the proceeds were not received by the
bank while it was a going concern, that they would be remit-
ted to plaintiff and not put into the mass of the assets of the
bank, for no one, it may be presumed, would deposit money in
a defunct and insolvent bank, and the bank no longer being a
going concern, could not receive and credit the deposit. All
that it could do in such a case as the present would be to remit
the proceeds to the owner of the drafts, for the bank had
ceased to have power and right to make a conditional credit
an absolute one. ' '2 8
"The act in making it a condition to the existence of the
privilege that the proceeds of the instrument be not deposited
by the bank to the credit of its principal, means that the money
must not be deposited unconditionally to the credit of the prin-
cipal with his authority. This occurs where the credit given
the principal is conditional and made in anticipation, and the
proceeds are not received until the bank ceases to operate as a
going concern. Plaintiff comes within the statute and is en-
titled to the privilege. 2 9 (Italics supplied.)
The three statements last quoted have been discredited in subse-
quent opinions, and the courts have maintained the correctness
of the decision upon the following reasoning:
"While it is disputed as to whether plaintiff had a right to
draw against the amounts so deposited, the unmistakable
weight of the evidence shows that it did not have the right to
draw against the amounts until the drafts were paid and the
proceeds received by the bank, and it does not admit of ques-
tion that no draft or check was honored against these amounts.
These are additional facts showing that the bank did not pur-
chase the drafts, and we conclude that it did not."30
In another controversy,31 involving the liquidation of the
27. 177 La. at 661, 148 So. at 909.
28. 177 La. at 663, 148 So. at 910.
29. 177 La. at 663, 148 So. at 909.
30. 177 La. at 662, 148 So. at 910.
31. In re Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Ferguson, Intervener), 182 La. 45, 161
So. 15 (1935), affirming the judgment of the court of appeal, 155 So. 266 (La.
App. 1934).
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Canal Bank and Trust Company, an intervener, on February 19,
1932, had deposited certain coupons with the bank "for collec-
tion." They were payable on March 1, 1933, but the account was
not credited until March 21, 1933, when the bank was operating
on a restricted payment basis. There was judgment for the inter-
vener with recognition of a privilege on all the bank's assets for
the amount collected. The court said:
"The only evidence offered in connection with the deposit
of the coupons is the deposit slip, which plainly shows that,
at the time the coupons were placed with the bank, both par-
ties considered them as items for collection, not only because
of the printed provisions on the deposit slip, but also because
they were plainly stamped in large red letters with the nota-
tion 'For Collection.' There is not a scintilla of evidence that
the intervener, expressly or impliedly, authorized the bank to
deposit the proceeds of the coupons to his account. Even if it
could be said that the bank, in the absence of express instruc-
tions to the contrary, had the implied authority to deposit the
proceeds to the intervener's account, certainly this implied
authority came to an end when the bank on March 2d went on
a restricted basis. It is inconceivable that anyone would au-
thorize the bank to deposit his funds under these circumstances.
If the bank had continued to act in its full normal capacity as
it was doing at the time the deposit was made, then it might
be reasonable to say that the alleged implied authority con-
tinued. In any event, the deposit of the proceeds was not
made until March 21st. This deposit certainly was not with
the consent, express or implied, of the intervener. '3 2
Again in the liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Company, an
intervention was filed by Clark & Company3 claiming the pro-
ceeds of three drafts, drawn on out-of-town banks, by preference
and priority over all other creditors, and a privilege on all the
assets of the bank by virtue of Section 1 of Act 63 of 1926. The
facts show that the interveners had a checking account with the
Canal Bank and had deposited these three drafts on unrestricted
endorsements on March 1, 1933. Credit was immediately given to
their account. The customary deposit slip (stating that the bank
acted only as agent for collection, reserving the right to charge
32. In re Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Ferguson, Intervener), 182 La. 45, 48-
49, 161 So. 15, 16 (1935).
33. In re Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention of Clark
& Co.), 181 La. 856, 160 So. 609 (1935).
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back any check not paid, et cetera) was used. These drafts were
duly collected, but in the meantime, the bank had been placed on
a restricted basis and on May 20, 1933, had been placed in liqui-
dation. The liquidators defended on the ground that the drafts
were deposited on an unrestricted endorsement; that the amount
was immediately credited to interveners' checking account, there-
by creating the relation of ordinary creditor and debtor between
the parties, and not the relationship of principal and agent; and
that, in consequence, Act 63 of 1926 was inapplicable. Judgment
was rendered recognizing plaintiff as an ordinary creditor of the
bank and denying the privilege claimed. The court said:
"The solution of the issues presented depends upon whether
or not the transaction between the intervener and the bank
resulted in a debtor and creditor relationship, or that of prin-
cipal and agent."84
The court again reiterated the rule that the intentions of the par-
ties must be determined as of the date the drafts are deposited
and not in the light of events that subsequently take place.5 In
applying that rule, the court said:
"The drafts having been deposited without a restrictive
indorsement by the depositor and at once, with its consent,
credited to its checking account by the bank, in order to give
the depositor the right to check against the funds immediately,
the depositor became a creditor of the bank and the bank the
owner of the paper, notwithstanding the fact that the bank
had the right under the law to debit the depositor's account in
the event the drafts were not honored, and, notwithstanding
the printed statement on the deposit slip that the bank was
receiving the drafts as agent for collection, because that state-
ment yields to and is governed by the implied intention of the
34. 181 La. at 862-863, 160 So. at 611.
35. Accord: In re Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention of Goodman &
Beer Co.) 170 So. 420 (La. App. 1936), reversing the original opinion, 167 So.
485 (La. App. 1936). The court said: "As we read that section, [referring to
Section 11 the existence of the privilege is made to depend on the nature of
the agreement which exists between the bank and the customer when the
draft, or check, or other item, is placed with the bank. It is only where it is
left with the bank for collection and remittance, or delivery, that the privi-
lege is granted and the privilege is made to depend in no way and to no ex-
tent upon whether the principal receives knowledge of the fact that the col-
lection has been made." (170 So. at 422.) In re Canal Bank & Trust Co.
(Midlo, Intervener), 172 So. 48 (La. App. 1937). See also Investors Syndicate
v. Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 172 So. 59 (La. App. 1937).
[Vol. III
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parties, in the absence of an express agreement between them
to the contrary."38
Since a creditor and debtor relationship existed, Act 63 of
1926 was inapplicable." To fortify its decision the court gave an
elaborate review of the authorities showing that "the weight of
authority supports the view that upon the deposit of paper un-
restrictedly indorsed, and credit of the amouht to the depositor's
account, the bank becomes the owner of the paper, notwithstand-
ing a custom or agreement to charge the paper back to the de-
positor in the event of dishonor."88 The holdings in the cases of
36. In re Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention of Clark
& Co.), 181 La. 856, 880, 160 So. 609, 616 (1935). Accord: In re Canal Bank &
Trust Co. (Goodman & Beer, Interveners), 167 So. 213 (La. App. 1936). Ex-
pressly following In re Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention
of Clark & Co.), 181 La. 856, 160 So. 609 (1935), the court held that "in spite
of the provisions of the deposit slip giving the right to the bank to 'charge
back' any items not ultimately collected, the relationship of principal and
agent terminated with the deposit of the items, since they were not taken
'for collection,' and that, although the bank would have had the right to
'charge back' the items if they had not been collected, nevertheless, since
they were collected, in order to determine the relationship between the par-
ties, it was necessary to consider the status of the parties at the time of the
deposit and not at the time of the ultimate collection." (167 So. at 214.) Also in
accord: In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co., 188 La. 211, 176 So. 1 (1937).
But see the case of State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940) where the
court held the rule inapplicable and said: "But that doctrine should not have"
application to a case where the object or purpose of the depositor, in under-
taking to contradict the stipulation on the deposit slip or receipt, is to make
it appear that the bank acted only for its own account and benefit; and not
at the instance or for the benefit of the depositor, in the consummation of a
fraudulent transaction on his part and for his benefit." (195 La. at 204, 196
So. at 69.)
37. Accord: Louisiana & N. W. Ry. v. Wylie, 157 So. 804 (La. App. 1934);
In re Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention of E. C. Palmer & Co.), 162 So.
88 (La. App. 1935), wherein the facts were similar to the ones in In re L4qui-
dation of Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention of Clark A Co.) (The court
of appeal annulled and reversed its original decree [154 So. 498 (La. App.
1934)] and rendered judgment in accordance with the Clark case.); In re
Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention of Progressive Inv.
Co.), 182 La. 856, 162 So. 644 (1935) (dealing with deposit of a check in the
regular course of business as had been the custom for a number of years and
holding Act 63 of 1926 inapplicable because the check was not for collection
and remittance but for collection and deposit); In re Canal Bank & Trust Co.
(Intervention of Grand Consistory of Louisiana), 161 So. 640 (La. App. 1935)
(expressly following the Clark case and holding that the provisions on the
deposit slip must yield to the intention of the parties); First National Bank
v. Commercial Bank, 164 So. 664 (La. App. 1935); In re Canal Bank & Trust
Co. (Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., Intervener), 170 So. 427 (La. App. 1936),
affirmed on rehearing, 173 So. 22 (La. App. 1937); In re Liquidation of Canal
Bank & Trust Co. (Ross & Heyn, Intervener), 186 La. 229, 172 So. 1 (1937); In
re Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Midlo, Intervener), 172 So. 48 (La. App. 1937).
The federal courts apply the same rule. Cf. Federal Reserve Bank v Malloy,
264 U.S. 160, 44 S.Ct. 296, 68 L.Ed. 617, 31 AL[ R. 1261 (1924); City of Douglas
v. Federal R6serve Bank of Dallas, 271 U.S. 489, 46 S.Ct. 554, 70 L.Ed. 1051
(1926); First National Bank of Rigby, Idaho v. First Utah National Bank of
Ogden, Utah, 15 F.(2d) 913 (C.C.A. 8th, 1936).
88. 181 L.. 856, 868, 160 So. 609, 612 (1935).
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Hall v. Farmers' Trust and Savings Bank 9 and In re Canal Bank
& Trust Company, In Liquidation (Intervention of Palmer)40 that
such provisions prevented the passage of title to the instrument
were discredited as being in the minority. Furthermore, Louisi-
ana has two statutes, Act 85 of 1916 and Act 86 of 1926, which
could be interpreted to cover this situation."1 In conclusion the
court said:
"Intervener's funds, having become commingled with the
bank's general deposits, and therefore incapable of identifica-
tion, cannot be claimed in specie as where the funds of a
special deposit are segregated [citing cases]. ' '' 2
A similar situation was presented in the liquidation of the
Canal Bank & Trust Company, when an intervention was filed by
Goodman & Beer Company4 8 invoking the provisions of Act 63 of
1926 and claiming the right to be paid the sum of $810 with priv-
ilege and priority out of the assets of the bank. Intervener on
November 29, 1932, placed with the Canal Bank for "collection"
a draft on Boero Napoli & Cia., Rosario, Argentina. The Canal
Bank forwarded the draft to its Argentina correspondent for col-
lection, with instructions to remit the proceeds to the National
City Bank of New York to the credit of the Canal Bank & Trust
Company. The draft was collected, and on March 1, 1933, when
the Canal Bank & Trust Company received notice of the credit,
intervener's account was credited and notice was sent. The no-
tice was not received until March 2, 1933, but the bank did not
open for business on that day or at any time thereafter. The evi-
dence showed that the intervener had previously dealt with the
Canal Bank & Trust Company and that it had been the estab-
lished custom of the bank to credit the sums collected to inter-
vener's deposit account as soon as collected. The court of appeals,
on rehearing, annulled and reversed its decision rendered on the
39. 177 La. 659, 148 So. 909 (1933).
40. 154 So. 498 (La. App. 1934), subsequently reversed on the reasoning in
the Clark case. See 162 So. 83 (La. App. 1935).
41. See concurring opinion by O'Niell, C. J., 181 La. 856, 885, 160 So. 609,
618 (1935), where he says: "There are two statutes, Act No. 85 of 1916 and
Act No. 86 of 1926, which declare, substantially, that, when a bank receives
from a customer an out-of-town check or draft for collection or deposit, the
bank may immediately give the customer credit for the amount without
becoming irrevocably the owner of the instrument, or forfeiting the right to
charge the amount back to the customer if the bank fails to make the col-
lection."
42. Concurring opinion of O'Niell, C. J., 181 La. at 88, 160 So. at 618.
43. 170 So. 420 (La. App. 1936), annulling former decree, 167 So. 485 (La.
App. 1936).
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first hearing,44 and held Act 63 of 1926 inapplicable. It was pointed
out that the implied authority of the bank to deposit the funds
collected resulted from the established custom of such dealing
between the parties.45 The court said:
"As we read that section, [referring to Section 1] the exis-
tence of the privilege is made to depend on the nature of the
agreement which exists between the bank and the customer
when the draft, or check, or other item, is placed with the
bank. It is only where it is left with the bank for collection
and remittance, or delivery, that the privilege is granted and
the privilege is made to depend in no way and to no extent
upon whether the principal receives knowledge of the fact
that the collection has been made....
"Therefore, when a person leaves with a bank an item for
collection, with instructions to collect it and to deposit the
proceeds to his credit as a general depositor, the act of 1926
has no application whatever.' 4
In such a contract the depositor has the right to withdraw the
funds the moment they are credited to his account, and the fact
that he did not have knowledge of the collection and deposit is
immaterial.
In the case of Owen v. Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Company'7
plaintiff sought to recover the proceeds of a check alleged to have
been deposited for collection, claiming also the privilege confer-
red by Section 1 of Act 63 of 1926. The court found that the check
had been deposited for collection, but upon collection it was de-
posited to plaintiff's account with his knowledge and consent,
thereby giving rise to a creditor and debtor relationship and pre-
cluding the application of the statute.
A somewhat different situation was presented by one of the
opponents in the case of In re Interstate Trust & Banking Com-
pany.48 An importer caused the bank to issue an irrevocable let-
ter of credit in favor of a coffee exporter in Brazil, who was au-
thorized to draw drafts to represent the purchase price of coffee.
The importer was obligated to provide the bank with funds to
44. 167 So. 485 (La. App. 1936).
45. Accord: In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention
of Progressive Co.), 182 La. 856, 162 So. 644 (1935); In re Liquidation of Canal
Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention of Grand Consistory of Louisiana), 161 So.
640 (La. App. 1935).
46. 170 So. 420, 422 (La. App. 1936).
47. 182 La. 347, 162 So. 8 (1935).
48. In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co., 188 La. 211, 176 So. 1 (1937).
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cover the drafts at least one day prior to maturity. In fact, the
drafts in question were by check drawn against his account some
two months prior to maturity. In the meantime and before the
maturity date of the drafts the bank failed. Both the importer
and the Brazilian exporter intervened, asking for a preference or
privilege under the provisions of Act 63 of 1926. The court re-
fused to grant either party a preference. The payment by the
importer was to satisfy his obligations to the bank under the ir-
revocable letter of credit and was not the deposit of an item for
collection and remittance to the Brazilian exporter. The bank was
obligated to the exporter whether it collected from the importer
or not. The Brazilian exporter was properly classified as an or-
dinary creditor because he had shipped the coffee solely on the
credit of the bank. He relied on the ability of the bank to pay the
draft and did not rely upon the success of the bank in collecting
the proceeds of the draft from the importer and remitting them
to him. In adopting that method of procedure, he became a cred-
itor of the bank and not of the importer.
Another phase of the problem is presented in the controversy
entitled In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Company
(Jones County, Intervener)." In order to provide funds for the
payment of bonds and coupons to become due and payable, Jones
County sent to the Hibernia Bank & Trust Company a cheek
drawn on another bank. In accordance with the established cus-
tom of dealings between these parties, the proceeds of this check
were credited to the "Jones County Bond Payment Account" and
the "Jones County 6 per cent Road Bond Coupon Account." These
funds, awaiting the maturity of the bonds and coupons and their
presentation for payment, were not segregated from the general
funds of the bank except by the booking entry. Before any dis-
bursement of these funds the bank was placed in liquidation.
Jones County brought this suit by intervention, claiming a priv-
ilege under Act 63 of 1926, Section 1. Relying chiefly upon the
decision of Hall v. Farmers' Trust & Savings Bank,50 the court
held 1 that the check had been sent to the bank for collection and
remittance, and not for deposit; that, therefore, Jones County
was entitled to a general privilege on the assets of the bank. 2 It
49. 181 La. 335, 159 So. 576 (1934). See Comment (1985) 9 Tulane L. Rev.
301.
50. 177 La. 659, 148 So. 909 (1933).
51. Higgins, J., dissenting, 181 LA. 335, 346, 159 So. 576, 580 (1934).
52. Accord: Interstate Trust & Banking Co. v. Jones County, 77 F.(2d)
go6 (1935).
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was argued that the instrument was sent for collection and remit-
tance or delivery to the bondholders and not for "remittance on
delivery to its principal"; therefore, that one of the stipulations
in the statute was lacking. In overruling this contention, the
court said:
"Our opinion, on the contrary, is that the expression means
for remittance or delivery to the principal or order. It is true
that statutes conferring a lien must be construed literally, not
liberally; but that does not mean that such statutes shall be
construed so literally and strictly according to their words as
to deprive them of their application to cases which they are
manifestly intended to apply to. It is not a liberal construction,
but only a reasonable construction, of this stattte, to say that
a remittance or delivery of a sum of money to a person des-
ignated by the owner to receive the money constitutes a re-
mittance or delivery to the owner of the money."u (Italics
supplied.)
Justice Higgins registered a vigorous dissent" on the grounds
that the court placed a liberal rather than a strict construction on
a statute creating a privilege; that the deposit was not for collec-
tion and remittance to the principal, but for collection and deposit
in a special account; and that no distinction was made by the act
between a deposit for the primary purpose of establishing credit
and a deposit for a special account. He said:
"It is clear that the 'statute does not create in favor of a
special depositor a lien and privilege on the assets of the bank,
to secure the deposit in the event the bank fails to carry out
the purpose for which the special deposit was made, or re-
turn the money to the depositor.
"If a person makes a special deposit of cash with a bank for
the purpose of liquidating future maturing obligations, and
the bank fails to pay out the money in accordance with the
agreement of, deposit, or to return the money to the depositor,
the act does not give the depositor a lien and privilege on the
assets of the bank. Practically speaking that is exactly what
was done in the instant case. Intervener never sent the check
for the purposes of collection, remittance or delivery, but for
the purpose of furnishing cash to be deposited and from which
-5. 181 La. 335, 345, 159 So. 576, 579 (1934).
54. 181 La. at 346, 159 So. at 580. The same position i taken by the
Comment (1935) 9 Tulane L. Rev. SOL
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deposit the future maturing obligations, i.e., the bonds and
coupons, were to be paid."55
A similar situation arose again upon the intervention by the
Pan American Life Insurance Company in' the liquidation pro-
ceedings of the Hibernia Bank & Trust Company,5 wherein a
privilege was claimed on the assets of the bank under Section 1 of
Act 63 of 1926. The only difference in the facts was that the bond-
holders were the claimants in this case instead of the depositors,
which is immaterial insofar as the point of law involved is con-
cerned. The court, speaking through Justice Higgins, after giving
an elaborate history of the statute and its purpose, expressly
overruled the decision of In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank &
Trust Company (Jones County, Intervener)57 and held that since
the funds were collected, not for remittance by a collecting agent
to his principal, but for deposit in order to pay bondholders, the
relationship was that of ordinary debtor and creditor, and Act 63
of 1926 was inapplicable. 8 The intervener was recognized as an or-
dinary creditor only.59 In regard to the purpose of the terms "col-
lection and remittance" and "delivery," the court, quoting from
an opinion rendered in the district court,60 said:
"The term 'delivery' was not intended by the framers of the
act to contemplate delivery to a third person, nor was the
word 'remittance' used in the sense of remitting to some third
person. Every situation presented by the Sabine case and
thought of by Senator Smith and Mr. North contemplated the
proceeds of the collection item going back into the hands of
the original party who owned the item and who gave it to the
bank to collect. The entire basis and trend of thought in the
discussion at the time the Act was prepared was to take care
of collection items.
"It will be seen too that the act provides in Section 1 that
55. 181 La. at 354, 159 So. at 582.
56. 185 La. 448, 169 So. 464 (1936). Cf. Note (1936) 10 Tulane L. Rev. 641.
57. 181 La. 335, 159 So. 576 (1934).
58. Accord: In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co., 188 La. 211, 176 So. 1
(1937). (See comment on this case in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1937-1938 Term (1939) 1 LOUisiANA LAW REVIEW 314, 398); Brock
v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 190 La. 572, 182 So. 679 (1938), reversing the
court of appeal, 172 So. 546 (La. App. 1937) and 180 So. 650 (La. App. 1938).
59. Rogers and Odom, J.J., dissented, being of the opinion that the court
should adhere to the interpretation which it placed on Act 63 of 1926 in the
case of In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Jones County, Inter-
vener), 181 La. 335, 159 So. 576 (1934).
60. In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co., 188 La. 211, 176 So. 1 (1937),
Hon. Hugh C. Cage, Trial Judge.
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the 'principal' shall have a privilege for the amount collected.
There is no clear explanation given to the term 'principal.'
The reason for the failure to explain it is that the parties fram-
ing the act contemplated no ambiguity, believing that only
one principal could exist, namely the one giving the item to
the bank for collection. I might point out in the connection
that it seems to me to be preposterous to contend that the act
intended to apply to trust situations of which the country
banks in 1926 were entirely ignorant.1
In regard to the Jones County case, the court said:
"In order to grant the privilege claimed by Jones County,
the majority opinion placed a liberal rather than a strict con-
struction upon the provisions of the act in favor of the claim-
ant of the privilege, contrary to the established jurispru-
dence." 62
A somewhat different angle was presented in the recent case
of Brock v. Citizens State Bank & Trust Company.0 The defend-
ant bank was acting as financial tutor for two minors who were
beneficiaries of deceased ex-service men. Under an agreement
with the Veterans' Bureau, it was required to receive and invest
in sound securities the funds coming to the minors. The bank re-
ceived the funds but instead of investing them deposited and
credited them to the account of the minors. The bank became in-
solvent and was placed in liquidation. The minors through their
duly qualified representatives claimed a preference and privilege
upon the bank's assets under the provisions of Act 63 of 1926,
Section 1. In denying the asserted privilege, the court said:
"In the case of In re Hibernia Bank & Trust Company, Pan
American Life Insurance Company, Intervener, 185 La. 448,
169 So. 464, this court held that the privilege referred to in the
statute arises only where the bank against whose assets the
privilege is sought to be exercised receives the instrument of
indebtedness solely for the purpose of collection. The addi-
tion of any other fiduciary relationship places the transaction
beyond the scope of the statute. Thus, in that case, the court
quoted with approval the following statement of the law con-
tained in the written opinion of the judge of the district court
61. 185 La. 448, 469, 169 So. 464, 471 (1936).
62. 185 La. at 483, 169 So. at 476.
63. 190 La. 572, 182 So. 679 (1938), reversing the court of appeal, 172 So.
546 (La. App. 1937) and 180 So. 650 (La. App. 1938).
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in the case of the Liquidation of the Interstate Trust & Bank-
ing Company, viz:
"'The proper criterion should be whether the one who gave
the item to the bank was trusting its solvency and financial
responsibility or whether he was availing himself solely and
only of the-collection facilities provided by that institution.
If he did not intend to trust the solvency and financial respon-
sibility of the bank, but intended solely and only to avail him-
self of its collection facilities, then he should be accorded the
privilege, but in cases where he relies upon its responsibility
or places it in a fiduciary relationship to himself, in which,
reliance upon its solvency is involved, then and in that event
no privilege should be granted because then his position is too
similar to that of an ordinary depositor who also relies upon
the bank's financial responsibility.' 185 La. 448, 480, 481, 169 So.
464, 475.
"The decision in the Pan American Life Insurance Com-
pany Case was approved by this court in the later case of In
re Interstate Trust & Banking Company, 188 La. 211, 176 So. 1.
"The limitations placed by the decisions in those cases on
the application of Section 1 of Act No. 63 of 1926 precludes
recognition of any privilege in favor of the minor claimants
because the defunct bank first received the funds of the mi-
nors as their tutor. Paragraph V of each agreement between
the bank and the Veterans Bureau provides that 'The func-
tions of the bank as tutor shall consist solely of receiving and
investing the funds paid to it as tutor***.' This fact was recog-
nized by the Court of Appeal for in its decision on rehearing
it states that 'as such tutor, it [the bank] received the checks
from the United States Veterans' Bureau, and was charged
with the duty of investing the proceeds thereof in accordance
with the laws of this state.' ""
That the courts intend to adhere to this limitation of appli-
cation in all such cases is evidenced by a very recent decision" in
which the court prefaced its opinion with the following concise
statement of the question involved:
"The question in all cases of this kind is whether the rela-
64. 190 La. 572, 578, 182 So. 67D, 681 (1938).
65. In re Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Ross & Heyn, Interven-
ers), 186 La. 229, 172 So. 1 (1937).
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tionship between the bank and the claimant is that of princi-
pal and agent or that of debtor and creditor."
The foregoing review of the jurisprudence shows that the courts
have twice redirected their course; once, by changing the law of
this state in regard to negotiable instruments from the minority
to the majority rules; a second time, by expressly overruling
their decision. The effect of these changes has been to delimit the
use of the statute for the purpose of obtaining preferences. The
final interpretation is in accord with the established jurispru-
dence of the state to the effect that statutes conferring a privilege
must be strictly construed.
In conclusion, the rules which have been crystallized by the
jurisprudence will be stated in the form of a short summary. The
proper criterion to be applied in determining whether Act 63 of
1926 is applicable or not should be whether the one who gave the
item to the bank was trusting its solvency and financial respon-
sibility so as to create the relationship of debtor and creditor, in
which case, the act is not applicable; or whether he was availing
himself solely and only of the collection facilities provided by
the bank, so as to create the relationship of principal and agent,
in which case, he should be accorded the privilege. In order to
sustain the claim of privilege, the party claimant must show that
he appointed the bank as his agent for the sole purpose of collect-
ing a check, draft, et cetera, and remitting the proceeds to him.
If the claimant allows the bank to deposit the proceeds collected
in his account or to the account of third persons for his benefit,
then the privilege does not attach.
RECORDATION
There is no necessity for recordation to preserve the priv-
ileges created by this statute.
RANK OF PRVLEGES
The respective ranks to which the privileges created by this
act are entitled are established by the act itself. In regard to the
privilege created by Section 1, the act provides that such "priv-
ilege shall be superior to the claims of all depositors of said agent
bank, the claims of all creditors of said agent bank having no
privilege and to all other general privileges on the property and
assets of said agent bank, except those for law and judicial
charges." (Italics supplied.) In regard to the privilege created by
Section 2, the act provides that such "privilege shall be superior
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to the claims of all depositors of said secondly mentioned bank
[referring to the drawee bank], the claims of all creditors of said
secondly mentioned bank having no privilege, and to all other
general privileges on the property and assets of said secondly
mentioned bank, except the privilege created by Section 1 of this
act and those for law and judicial charges." (Italics supplied.)
It will be noted that the act lays down no rule of priority in
case of a conflict with a special privilege. The jurisprudence thus
far has been concerned only with the liquidator of the bank who
represents the depositors and creditors, and the person claiming
the privilege under the act. The dispute has not been in regard to
priority but as to whether the claimant was entitled to the bene-
fit of the privileges created by the statute.
